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After thanking James Grunig for providing an architecture for 
thinking about public relations (PR) for 25 years, more academics should 
now consider questions of reassessing his formidable intellectual legacy. 
This seems timely, for with his retirement there is a generational change 
among PR thinkers and some colleagues, especially American and 
Australasian, have started the reassessment 1.  
 
I am drawn to the feasibility of putting ideas of power relations, 
instead of concepts of communicative symmetry, at the heart of a 
descriptive explanation of PR in pluralist, liberal democracies with 
competitive markets and vigorous civil societies. Grunig’s paradigm has 
turned the academic gaze too quickly towards communication studies. 
The task is to turn it, instead, to political studies, particularly towards 
pluralism and interest intermediation2.  
 
Grunig in his first three categories fits in with such a power-
centric approach, but his fourth category is a normative one and it 
privileges the qualities of symmetrical communicative relationships 
between entities as an evaluator of excellence. Are PR messages 
amongst entities true, respectful, negotiable; are they dialogic; do they 
                                                 
1 See Gower (2006). 
2 This turn takes the argument away from Foucault but one way back to his work could be via his 
‘power relations’ concept of power, and his fusion of ‘power’ and ‘knowledge’ into the one notion of 
‘power/knowledge’ (Hodgson 2000. pp. 41 and 45). PR, it can be argued,  is a category of knowledge 
production and/or distribution.  
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produce symmetrical advantage and disadvantage for senders and 
receivers? If PR lacks these qualities, it is deformed. It has been 
perverted from its essence of two-way symmetry. I find these positions a 
second order explanation of PR, suggestive of a deeper one. The 
Grunigian fourth category needs to be removed to show the 
fundamentals on which it rests.  
 
Instead of focusing on communicative symmetry, I want to explore 
the relationships of dominants and subordinates, of principals and 
subalterns in politics, markets, and civil society and whether they 
explain PR messaging3. I start with three assumptions. They are:  
1) PR messages are communicative (symbolic) expressions of the 
power status of their senders in their relations with stronger and weaker 
competitors and co-operators. For example, in a take-over battle 
between businesses, the factual content and narrative structure of the 
messages, and the denotations and connotations of their words are 
rooted in the state of the contest over power gains and losses 
experienced by the sender. We correctly say that PR message senders 
have ‘a strong’ or ‘a weak hand’ in these contests.  
2) PR messages are produced as a contribution (alongside 
material, financial, legal and marketing contributions) communication 
makes to the contest for more resources. Resources are quantifiable 
manifestations of power and are material, ideological, psychological, or 
reputational in form. So, for example, products, promoted with adverts 
and marketing PR, are launched to increase the resource of more market 
share. If the products thrive, these resources of more production, more 
revenue and more profit are business power.  We correctly say that 
successful businesses have more power than less successful ones. I 
argue, therefore, that knowing how powerful or unpowerful PR message 
senders are, and what more power they seek in any set of stakeholder 
relationships will tell us why messages are sent; how they are 
                                                 
3 I use the nouns ‘messages’ and ‘messaging’ as short referents to all PR activity. 
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constructed, and what effects they are likely to have on the power 
relations of the sender.  
3) My third assumption is that while power causes PR messaging 
in the very great majority of its uses, PR messaging becomes a resource 
and therefore an expression of power when it is responded to by the 
public as continuous compliance. This is PR as the power of the most 
extreme form of one-way messaging, propaganda, and this PR 
propaganda is a component of what Lukes has termed sociological 
power (1975, 2005. See below.) This is PR as a continuous, often 
unnoticed, conditioner of public opinion and behaviour. This third 
assumption of PR as power effect and power cause is a danger to my 
thesis for it makes power and PR both cause and effect of each other. 
There is an incoherence here and my management of it as an exceptional 
case requires more work. 
 
I note some characteristics of my assumptions. They concentrate 
on PR message senders in their network of power relationships with 
their stakeholders. They do not concentrate on message receivers and 
my thinking only engages with them when they in turn are message 
senders in their bilateral and multilateral relations with other 
stakeholders. My tentative theory is not normative for it is a value-
neutral methodology of analysis: instead positive values and truths – or 
their opposites – come from the intentions and consequences of sending 
PR messages as power-caused and power-causing communication.4  I 
reduce the exposure of PR people to values and truth when I 
characterise them and their work as technical agency (human and 
functional) servicing the power needs of their principals inside 
organisations and groups 5. Another characteristic is that power 
                                                 
4 I do, however, argue elsewhere (Moloney 2006) for a normative theory of communicative equality in 
liberal democracies. i.e. that PR, a set of communication techniques neutral in themselves as regards 
values, should happen in conditions of communicative equality where all who wish to use it have a 
threshold minimum of resources to do so effectively. 
5 There is a subsidiary problem of learnt helplessness conditioning the behaviour of PR people in their 
role of technical agents. It concerns excessive passivity before the messages which they are instructed 
to publish. It raises ethical issues (e.g. ‘I follow the client’s/boss’s brief. I do what my superiors tell 
me’.) which are noted but not discussed here. 
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reproduces itself in one of two ways, either via the control and command 
of resources or alternatively via persuasive capacity to gain voluntary 
access to the same resources. I also note that I approach power concepts 
from an institutional and group perspective with an emphasis on 
pluralism and interest intermediation. More sociological perspectives 
which focus on individuals, knowledge production in society, and power 
relations need to be examined. Finally, my assumptions are social 
Darwinian in that they categorise communicative relations as a form of 
adaptation to a competitive environment in the struggle to survive by 
organisations and groups. 
 
I want to make the body of this article an examination of three 
authors who have written about power and of whether their ideas can 
be useful for my tentative power-centric theory of PR.  But first I make a 
detour to look at my central concept. When we say ‘power’ we flinch 
because it is a word with connotations of force, of command and control 
(power over). I do include these extreme and threatening expressions of 
power (working for the armed forces, the police, the administration of 
justice), but I gather in also other, more benign expressions which come 
within the same category of ‘power over’. I mean power as persuasion 
(in business, public service and civil society PR). Examples are public 
information campaigns to correct behaviour (smoking and alcohol 
consumption). These two expressions of ‘power over’ (corrective and 
persuasive categories: see John Scott below) underlie much of the social 
relations of the political economy and of civil society – in retail markets 
between supermarkets and small suppliers; amongst pressure groups 
competing on policy and fund raising; amongst churches and their 
dissenters; amongst football clubs competing for players, and in the 
relations between emergency services and flooded out families. These 
are examples of power as the transformative capacity of an agent to 
make their preferences prevail. 
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I’m also including in the phrase ‘power relationships’ relationships 
of another kind: of the ‘power to’ kind which are about capacity and 
enablement6. For example, the capacity of Greenpeace to attract media 
attention, raise funds, and buy ships to harass whalers; or the capacity 
of humanitarian campaigning groups to enthuse supporters and recruit 
new ones. Greenpeace have the capacity to generate enough ideological 
appeal and/or attractive action via campaigns to attract extra resources 
of members, funds, policy maker support. Remember their campaign 
against the Brent Spar. 
 
Detour over and now back to authors whose writings I want to 
look at because they help us argue through to the centrality of power to 
PR. First, I bring into our discussion the work of James Scott who wrote 
Domination and the Arts of Resistance (1990) and his idea of public and 
private transcripts in the relations of dominant and subordinate groups 
in a society. In an extreme example of his transcript idea, he says that 
slaves and masters in the American South talked to each other in two 
modes (pp.1-15): the public transcripts of the masters justified their 
ownership of people and the private one complained about slave 
attitudes of deep resentment and incipient revolt; the public transcripts 
of slaves spoke of resentful obedience and passive acceptance, while the 
private one was of injustice and rage.7 He also gives examples of class 
relations from French society in the 19th century; from George Elliot’s 
novel Adam Bede in 19th century England; and of race relations in 
colonised Burma in the 1920s observed by George Orwell. Scott’s thesis 
is that there are two narratives (that’s my word from now on for his word 
‘transcripts’8) in the relations between powerful groups and 
                                                 
6 Berger (2005) links ‘power over’ relations as one of the ways in which dominant coalitions have PR 
relations with others. Another way is ‘power with’. 
7 Scott notes the term ‘hush arbor’ (p.xi) as a secret social space where slaves could talk freely. 
8 Goffman’s distinction between’ back’ and’ front regions’ in the presentation of an individual for daily 
work (1972, pp.109-140) appears to have similarity with the translation of Scott’s private and public 
transcripts idea into the concept of private and public narratives in PR. But the similarity is perhaps 
limited for Goffman writes (preface) about the performance of individuals in non-mediated work 
circumstances, i.e. ‘any concrete social establishment’, and while this condition could apply to private 
lobbying, it could not apply to media relations. Separately, Goffman does note (p.14) that presentations 
by individuals include deceitful and feigned misinformation. 
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marginalised ones, and that the private narrative (transcript) is nearly 
always inaccessible to outsiders. It is marked by truthful statements 
which cannot be said publicly because of fear of consequences.  
 
Do PR people write public narratives for their organisations and 
groups and are there influential private narratives in the background?  
Do they write for powerful organisations (big businesses; hospitals; the 
police; regulatory bodies, religious bodies), and for subordinate 
organisations (SMEs; trade unions; pressure groups for refugees; 
transsexual groups seeking power)? They do, for PR is used by the most 
and the least powerful organisations and groups but these examples 
show a limitation in my transfer of Scott’s idea to PR. He built his 
‘transcripts’ idea on very stark examples of dominant/subordinate 
relationships in a white supremacist, settler society. Witness his 
referencing of slavery. The power gap in PR in our societies is much, 
much narrower but there are still noticeable varying widths of command 
and control and of transformative capacity to achieve ends. It may be 
quite broad in some cases (Tesco and local food suppliers) and narrower 
in others (BA and the cabin crew in the T&G trade union). But I maintain 
that there is enough power differential in modern PR relationships for 
there to be private and public narratives, and hence for the core 
relationship between message sender and receiver to be a struggle for 
communicative advantage. Another limitation – but I think not a 
sustainable one - of my transfer of Scott’s idea to PR is that in some 
circumstances (e.g. private lobbying and employer and trade union 
negotiations) the public and private narratives become one. They do 
merge because often in these circumstances, the balance of power in 
relationships is in equilibrium. The sides can speak without reservation, 
knowing they have equal resources of retaliation and sanction. This 
circumstance of equal power illustrates that the distinction between 
public and private narratives does not exist when power status of 
competitive PR message senders is the same. When there is a power 
imbalance, there are two narratives because the imbalance leads to 
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aggressive and defensive competitive actions of all types (including PR) 
to increase, decrease the power gap. To return to James Scott’s slavery 
example, I would bet that in modern South Africa, there are many fewer 
public/private discourses than in the former apartheid, racist state. 
 
If James Scott writes about types of narratives about power, John 
Scott (2001) writes about the tone of voice different sorts of power use in 
public narrative. He distinguishes between corrective and persuasive 
power, the first dominating through constraint and the second through 
discursion (2001, p.16). He borrows from Pareto and gives an 
anthropomorphic characterisation to these two styles of domination. 
Thus there are ‘lions’ and ‘foxes’ correcting subordinates and there are 
‘owls’ and ‘bears’ persuading subordinates. I think we can transfer these 
characterisations to public relations narratives. For example, the owls 
dominate through expertise and I hear the expert tone in messages from 
health education bodies, food standards people, the climate change 
lobby.  These narratives have high source credibility with many 
professors and doctors doing the talking. There are references to the 
truth of scientific data and appeals to values such as good health, 
healthy eating and harmony with nature. ‘Bears’ on the other hand have 
an authoritative but benign tone of insistence and certainty. You hear it 
when politicians say that ‘there is no alternative’ or when business 
people say that they had to close down the factory but that they 
regretted making you redundant. We can hear the tones of the ‘lions’ 
(messages from the British army in Basra; public information at the time 
of terrorist attacks, real and suspected in London; and police messaging 
to residents in flooded towns). We can listen to the ‘foxes’ (the seducers, 
the manipulators, the deceivers of the public) – but I will leave you to fill 
in with your own examples.  
 
Apart from the two Scotts (they are not related), the third author 
to investigate for ideas about power transferable to PR is Stephen Lukes. 
His three ‘dimensions’ of  power can be summarised as noticeable 
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conflict among interests; controlling agendas for public debate and 
policy making; and third, conditioning the beliefs and thoughts of others. 
Lukes (1974) associated these three ‘dimensions’ (his word) with 
decreasing levels of public visibility of the power exercised. More power 
is associated with less visibility of it. The visibility levels can be 
associated, I argue, with different PR types and these different types can 
be called the visible, the indeterminate, and the invisible levels of public 
relations.  
 
Lukes’ first dimension of power and my most visible public 
relations type is the public contest between, say, a business and a trade 
union; a business threatened with take-over; and the pro-hunting and 
anti-hunting groups. Their media releases, interviews, stunts, protest 
marches are very visible.  
 
Lukes’ second dimension of power is about controlling policy 
agendas; and my corresponding level of PR visibility – an indeterminate 
one - is lobbying. It is ‘indeterminate’ because it is often hard for those 
observing to know when it takes place. Lobbying is direct personal 
influence on policy makers and often happens in private. It seeks to 
create a policy bias in its favour, and so actively shapes the political 
agenda in a hidden way. Do we know how many times Rupert Murdoch 
and Tony Blair have met and what they talked about or agreed? These 
meetings, I argue, created bias to shape agendas, and this bias is the 
central feature of Luke’s second dimension. Lobbying, of course, is done 
by most interests and groups in a liberal democracy and as such its 
consequence, the mobilisation of bias to shape agendas, is not a concern 
specifically related to business, as in Murdoch’s case. For example, trade 
unions seek to create bias in public agenda, but many of the meetings 
and outcomes are known about. As is the lobbying by pensioners, 
environmentalists, and church leaders (e.g. over adoption by gay 
couples). It is this melange of visible/invisible meetings and therefore 
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known/unknown outcomes which leads me to use the term 
‘indeterminate visibility’.  
 
In a representative democracy, this mobilisation of bias is a 
constant aim of all interests and groups9; it can be seen as a constant 
state of searching for extra resource, and can be viewed benignly for 
democracy when all who want to speak can do so. However, it is the 
amount of mobilised bias generated privately via PR lobbying by the 
single most powerful interest in a liberal democracy (business) which 
makes for concern. Berger (2005, p.6) notes the connection and its bias to 
business: ‘There is little doubt that public relations has effectively 
served capitalism and powerful economic producers for many years, but 
whether it has served or can serve stakeholders and society as well from 
inside or outside the dominant coalition is a contested issue’. 
 
Business, as a set of ideas and as a practice, is so constituative of 
known liberal democracy that it has structural power to affect the 
circumstances in which it operates. This power is Lukes’ third 
dimension. It is the power of dominant groups to condition the thinking 
of others.10 It is the power to keep conflict latent in situations where 
there is ‘. . . a contradiction between the interests of those exercising 
power and the real interests of those they exclude. . .’, even when the 
excluded may not express or be conscious of their interests (pp. 24-5). 
Lukes calls this a fully sociological form of power: ‘Indeed, is it not the 
supreme exercise of power to get another or others to have the desires 
you want them to have – that is to secure their compliance by controlling 
their thoughts and desires?’ (p. 23). It is this undeclared, unnoticed 
                                                 
9 It is hard to think of  interests and groups which do not seek more support. The author suggested 
Cisterian Monks to students and they found a monastery with a promotional website seeking applicants 
and sales of organic food. 
10 Structural power maintains unpopular groups in their elite positions. A Mori/FT poll, June 2003, 
gave out that 11% of the general public trusted ‘directors of large companies’ to tell the truth. 80% did 
not. In a February 2003 poll, business leaders came 16th out of 19 in a list of people to be trusted to tell 
the truth. The figures were given by Stewart Lewis, MORI director, on 20.2.04, at the ‘Trust in the Age 
of Suspicion’ conference, Miramar Hotel, Bournemouth, organised by the Centre for Public 
Communications Research, Bournemouth University. 
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process of producing ideological compliance via sociological PR and via 
private lobbying which leads me to equate Lukes’ third dimension of 
power to invisible PR.  
If you teach PR, it is sobering thought that your subject 
contributes to this category of social compliance. One way to assuage 
unease is to argue for a set of societal conditions where compliance does 
the least damage to democracy. Lukes makes this search by us PR 
academics more needed when we read in his second edition (2005, p. 
116) that he attributes compliance to failures of rationality, and explicitly 
mentions, inter alia, ‘experts in communication and public relations’ as 
producers of these failures. He slightly reduces our concern when he 
describes this power of compliance to reproduce social arrangements as 
‘the power to mislead’ (p.149) but notes that it is ‘always partial and 
limited’ and is ‘always focused on particular experience and is never . . . 
more than partially effective’ (p. 150). 
 
What I am exploring in this paper is the possibility of theories of 
power taking the place of theories of communication as better primary 
explanations of PR. I argue that ‘power over’ and ‘power to’ in the social 
relations of organisations and groups determine the intentions behind, 
and the framing of, PR messages by their producers. PR is the 
communicative expression of power relations as they are now or as they 
are wanted to be. I also argue that this constitution of PR messages by 
power operates at all levels of dominance and subordination, and is done 
by all categories of organisations and groups. It is usual to quote macro 
and systemic examples such as PR’s role in the generation of market 
relationships between institutions (rather than co-operative ones);  in 
sustaining monarchical relations (rather than republican ones) between 
state and citizens, and its role in exploitative relations towards natural 
resources (rather than sustainable ones).  
 
But I want to add more micro and particular examples. Charities 
call for the reformation of various ills to empower the poor and abused. 
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Trade unions campaign for more power over employers to redistribute 
income towards labour and to circumscribe management’s discretion. 
Marketing directors announce lower prices in order to increase market 
share and revenue take. Fashion houses send the PR message from the 
catwalk to increase market share via brand recognition. Tennis clubs 
fight parking restrictions outside their courts to attract more members 
and their fees.  
These examples illustrate that PR is not only about the 
maintenance of existing power allocations in society but also about 
intentions of PR producers to increase their allocations. The examples 
tell us that the power of businesses, public institutions, and of civil 
society institutions change over time. We see Lukes’s point about 
dominant institutions achieving only partial and ineffective compliance 
when we think of the decreased power of candlestick makers, trades 
unions, and churches, and the rise in power of new business sectors, the 
changing influence of cause groups (few environmental ones existed 
before 1960). These cases let us look at PR produced by the totally 
extinguished, the partially impotent and the newly potent. 
 
I want to end on an optimistic note about PR as a technical 
function servicing the causal agents of benign social relations. It is 
fitting in 2007 to mention that the campaign to abolish slave trading 
involved activities which we recognise as ours – logos; slogans; 
lobbying; petitions, press releases11. We find this historical example of 
200 hundred years ago instructive and inspiring today.  The abolition of 
British slave trading, and of slave owning in 1833 prompts us to think of 
a methodology for analysing power-centric PR. It reminds us again of 
James Scott’s distinction between private and public narratives. I think 
that we can make it a feature of how to do an analysis. The difference 
between the two narratives is a measure of what message makers do 
not want to say publicly because disclosure of the private narrative 
would reveal strengths or weaknesses in their ability to make their 
                                                 
11 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/6476645.stm Accessed 24.3.07. 
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preferences prevail or not. Can we take amounts of disclosure as proxies 
for strong and weak positions?   
 
I suggest that Lukes can help us as well. We could take the 
visibility index of his power dimensions and make them benchmarks. For 
example, public displays of PR messaging would indicate that a public 
power contest was happening; evidence of lobbying would tell us a 
more private contest was under way to change policy while PR which 
conditioned beliefs and behaviour would indicate ideological challenge 
and maintenance in society. Outlining a methodology makes the 
difficulties evident and the effort to solve them will only be worthwhile if 
it is judged that there is a basic validity to centring power in our 
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